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I. INTRODUCTION
Bad experience, not good experience, is often the more effective
teacher. I know that was the case for me as an attorney handling my first
real foray into litigation over the competing forms of a manufacturer and
its buyer. My client, the manufacturer, was justifiably proud of its well
engineered product that it had sold across the world, and its in-house coun-
sel was equally eager that I should produce a result exonerating the terms
included in their detailed quotation over conflicting terms in the buyer's
purchase order. Surely, we thought, the terms of the manufacturer, as the
provider of an essential product that would not have existed but for the
manufacturer's ingenuity, should prevail over those of this one buyer who
simply sent in an order with his own terms. Dead wrong: my motions for
partial summary judgment were denied.
Warning: the world of conflicting forms and terms can become a subtle
maze of mirrors in which an attorney is likely to become lost without a firm
grasp of UCC Article 2's notions of what is a real offer, what is a final
acceptance, and of what resolutions the battle of the forms provisions pro-
vide (if they indeed apply at all given all the facts), especially if one at-
tempts to navigate with a bias (and no, it is no excuse to the attorney that
one's client was ever so anxious to hear an exculpatory answer).
II. FIRST, WHAT CONTROLS?: ARTICLE 2 OR GENERAL
CONTRACT LAW?
Although Article 2 of Mississippi's UCC governing sales of goods1
clearly does not apply to contracts for the provision of services only, the
1. Miss. CODE ANNm. §§ 75-2-101 to -725 (2010).
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issue can arise whether the UCC applies to contracts where the provision
of both goods and services are involved. The UCC by its terms applies to
sales of goods involving "things. .. which are movable at the time of identi-
fication to the contract."3 But an issue can arise as to the UCC's applica-
tion when a contract involves the supply of goods and services together, as
one would often find, for example, in a construction contract.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi gave some examples of mixed trans-
actions of goods and services in J.0. Hooker & Sons, Inc. In one case, a
contract for installation of carpets in a large apartment complex was held to
be primarily a contract for sale, rather than installation, and thus was sub-
ject to Article 2. However, a subcontract for cement construction work
was held to be primarily a services contract, although also involving a sale
of goods.5
So, how can one distinguish between primarily sales or services con-
tracts on a reliable basis? In J.0. Hooker & Sons, Inc., an issue arose as to
whether a subcontractor's agreement to renovate public housing, which in-
volved tearing out cabinets and installing new ones, involved the cost of
disposing of the cabinets as well. The court held that determining whether
Article 2 applies "should depend upon the nature of the contract and also
upon whether the dispute in question primarily concerns the goods fur-
nished or the services rendered under the contract." 6 Thus, asking what
the primary nature of the contract is (sales or services) is not enough alone
to determine whether Article 2 applies; it is the nature of the dispute itself
that should ultimately determine whether the sales laws govern the contro-
versy. The court in Hooker stated that if the quality of the cabinets sold
had been at issue, Article 2 could have applied, but because the dispute was
a standard contract question involving the services aspects of the transac-
tion, Article 2 would have no application.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi revisited the Hooker criteria for ap-
plication of the UCC in Upchurch Plumbing, Inc. v. Greenwood Utilities
Commission.8 In Upchurch Plumbing, a dispute arose over the upgrade of
a control system for a GE combustion turbine.' Software for the control
system contained a programming defect.10 The court, applying the Hooker
mixed transactions test, found that the UCC did not apply to the dispute
2. See J.0. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So. 2d 396, 400 (Miss. 1996).
3. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-105.
4. J0. Hooker & Sons, Inc., 683 So. 2d at 400 (citing Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs.,
Inc., 380 A.2d 618 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)).
5. Id. (citing Freeman v. Shannon Constr. Inc., 560 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
6. Id. (emphasis in original).
7. Id.
8. 964 So. 2d 1100 (Miss. 2007).
9. Id. at 1102.
10. Id.
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because, taking the contract as a whole, sixty-percent of the contract re-
lated to services for the specialized, defective design of software and test-
ing, which are services, while only forty-percent of the contract dealt with
the hardware.
III. STATUTE OF FRAUDs REQUIREMENTS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Left to their own devices without the intervention of lawyers and
courts, many merchants would go about the business of selling and buying
using the phone alone. However, there is a strict UCC Article 2 statute of
frauds requirement for the sale of goods that requires merchants to docu-
ment their transactions in writing for sales transactions of $500 or more.12
The statute of frauds for sales of goods for $500 or more imposes the fol-
lowing requirements for the transaction to be enforceable in the courts:
1) the writing must be "sufficient to indicate that a contract
for sale has been made between the parties,"
2) the writing must be "signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought," and
3) the writing must specify a quantity.' 3
Notice that the writing requirement does not require inclusion of a price
term because the parties may have contracted on the basis of a published
price list, or because the gap can be filled by the trier of fact finding what a
reasonable price would be.' 4
Although generally the statute requires that the writing be "signed by
the party against whom enforcement is sought" or his agent or broker, a
merchant can obtain a contract enforceable against the party with whom he
is dealing, albeit unsigned, by sending a written confirmation of the con-
tract to the other merchant. The contract is confirmed provided that the
other merchant does not reply with an objection to the terms within ten
days of receipt of the confirmation.' 5 Thus, the merchant who fails to an-
swer a written confirmation of a contract within ten days of receipt cannot
later claim a violation of the statute of frauds as a defense to the contract
(although the merchant can always dispute that, in fact, a prior oral con-
tract was made at all, or its contents).' 6 The UCC therefore provides an
important incentive for buyers and sellers to send out written confirmations
of their transactions promptly following oral discussions, which in turn is an
11. Id. at 1111 (holding that the dispute "clearly concern[ed] the testing of the system, which is a
service").
12. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-201(1) (2010).
13. Migerobe, Inc. v. Certina USA, Inc., 924 F.2d 1330, 1333 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Mississippi
law).
14. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-201 cmt 1.
15. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-201(2).
16. See Miss. CODE ANN § 75-2-201 cmt 3.
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important reason for the many written forms exchanged between
merchants.1 7
Moreover, "[t]he statute of frauds can be met though the integration
of several documents, each of which alone might not be sufficient to meet
these three requirements." 8 In Migerobe, for example, the court was
presented with the issue of whether there was a contract for the sale of
watches enforceable against the seller. The court held that the contract was
enforceable against the seller based on the integration of two signed inter-
nal memoranda and an unsigned order form that the seller had not actually
exchanged with the buyer during the course of the transaction, but which
appear from the opinion to have been found in discovery in the seller's
files. 19 The court stated that "[t]he signed writing need not refer explicitly
to the unsigned writing; a Mississippi court would consider them to be inte-
grated if the signed writing 'makes[s] at least an implied reference to the
other writing.' "20 The seller's documents, signed and unsigned, viewed to-
gether, were sufficient for the court to find that the statute of frauds was
satisfied, and demonstrated both that the seller had authorized its salesman
to offer its merchandise at a discounted price, and that the buyer had ac-
cepted the offer.2 1
Further, "[a] contract that does not meet the three requirements [of
§ 75-2-201] but is valid in other respects is enforceable, 'if the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
that a contract for sale is made.' "22 Also, the writing reqfiirement of the
statute of frauds ceases to apply if the buyer has received and accepted the
goods (as "acceptance" is defined at § 75-2-606), or if the buyer has made
payment for them.
Finally, manufacturers should be aware that the writing requirement
of the statute of frauds does not apply to the sale of goods that are to be
specifically manufactured for the buyer, that are not suitable for sale to
others in the ordinary course of business, and for which the seller has made
a substantial beginning of manufacture or obtained commitments obtained
for their procurement. 23
IV. THE PURCHASING PROCESS: RFQ's, QUOTEs, PHONE CALLS,
EMAILS, PURCHASE ORDER AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FORMS
Ideally, parties to a sales contract will sit down around a conference
table to hammer out every detail of their transaction, commit their agree-
ment to one final, written document containing all the terms, and duly ac-
knowledge the agreement by execution by the all parties. However, the
17. See generally infra Part IV.
18. Migerobe, Inc., 924 F.2d at 1333.
19. Id. at 1333-34.
20. Id. (quoting Ludke Elec. Co. v. Vicksburg Towing Co., 127 So. 2d 851, 854 (Miss. 1961)).
21. Id. at 1335.
22. Fairly v. Turan-Foley Imps., Inc., 65 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Miss. CODE ANNi.
§ 75-2-201(3)(b)).
23. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-201(3)(a) (2010).
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real world of sales is a different place in which parties, on their own, ex-
change form documents, telephone calls and emails, and subsequently find
themselves seeking the guidance of their attorneys and the courts or arbi-
trators to find the scope of their contract after something has gone wrong.
The real world purchasing process depends on an informal exchange
of forms because, unlike the search for a single contractor to build a unique
building, the provision of goods is in an environment of quickly-repeated
sales transactions for the same or similar items, often involving suppliers at
some distance from the purchaser. A purchaser, for example, may begin
the process by faxing or e-mailing out multiple Requests for Quotation
(RFQs) to possible suppliers. Or a manufacturer may start the process by
sending out numerous Quotations to potential buyers. In either case, only
a portion of the RFQs or Quotations broadcast to potential parties to a
transaction will end up leading to a completed sale.
A purchaser's RFQ or a manufacturer's Quotation may be quite de-
tailed, with attachment or reference to specifications and other design and
product-type testing criteria, as well as industry performance standards that
must be met. However, the RFQ and Quotation may also leave out impor-
tant terms, such as quantity, determination of product options, and final
pricing or delivery terms.
So, once the buyer has received the seller's Quotation, the buyer may
seek to set forth in greater detail the transaction by issuing a Purchase Or-
der, specifying the buyer's expectations for the seller's performance in
terms of production options chosen, specifications, industry standards that
must be met, quantities, delivery dates, and final price.
Once the manufacturer or seller receives the buyer's Purchase Order,
the seller may attempt to add terms to the transaction. For example, the
seller may attempt to add terms for the inclusion of attorney's fees for col-
lection in the event of non-payment, or an arbitration provision in the
event of a dispute. The seller can add terms by sending out an acknowl-
edgement form thanking the buyer for his Purchase Order, but stating, by
the way, that the terms on the back of the acknowledgement form are in-
cluded in the transaction's terms. Similarly, the seller also may attempt to
add terms by adding provisions on the back of invoices, such as a finance
charge for late payment.
In between the exchange of forms, of course, there are likely to have
been telephone calls and memoranda confirming the terms discussed on
the phone. All the communications in the purchasing process, of course,
written and verbal, may lead to much confusion if the deal later falls apart
or if there is a refusal of payment. Just what was the contract the parties
made? The UCC seeks to supply an answer.
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V. FINDING THE OFFER: IS THE SELLER'S QUOTATION AN OFFER
OR JUST AN INVITATION To DEAL?
The starting point for finding the scope of a sales contract amid the
exchange of forms and phone calls is to ask: which communication consti-
tutes the offer, and which comprises the acceptance? As each first-year law
student would recognize, a valid contract must have an offer and an accept-
ance.2 4 Therefore, one must first identify the offer and acceptance before,
say, looking at the possible incorporation of additional terms by an accept-
ance or confirmation under the UCC's "Battle of the Forms" provision of
§ 75-2-207.25 Indeed, as will be seen later:
For a "battle of the forms" to arise and trigger the provi-
sions of § 2-207, there must be conflicting forms to begin
with, each of which satisfies the common-law or statutory
requirements for an offer. If the first form is not an offer,
there can be no battle. 26
Thus, the first "battle" that a merchant may face, perhaps the most impor-
tant one, is not the classic battle of the forms applying UCC § 75-2-207
involving acceptances and confirmations, but a battle over which document
constitutes the offer that can be accepted to form a contract.
Identifying the legal "offer" may not be as easy as one would think.
True, it is easy to see that a buyer's RFQ likely would not be the offer
because it is not a contractual commitment by the buyer. A RFQ is merely
the buyer's invitation to a seller to start the negotiation process by provid-
ing a statement of prices at which the seller is willing to sell. The more
problematic question is whether the seller's quotation is the offer.
Although one might think intuitively that a quotation would be a
seller's offer because it sets forth prices at which he is willing to sell, courts
in many instances have found that the quotation in fact is not a contractual
offer at all. Instead, many courts have found that the seller's quotation,
like the buyer's initial RFQ, is just a means of proposing further negotia-
tions that, in turn, will lead to the parties arriving at more complete terms
that will become the contract. "Typically, a price quotation is considered
an invitation for an offer, rather than an offer to form a binding con-
tract." 2 7 Where a quotation leaves a number of terms open for negotiation,
it is not an offer, but an invitation to negotiate further.2 8 "Instead, a
buyer's purchase agreement submitted in response to a price quotation is
usually deemed the offer." 29
24. See Anderton v. Bus. Aircraft, Inc., 650 So. 2d 473, 476 (Miss. 1995).
25. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-207(2010).
26. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods., Inc. v. Leviton Mfg., Inc., 15 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1995).
27. white Consol. Indus., Inc. v. McGill Mfg. Co., 165 F.3d 1185, 1190 (8th Cir. 1999).
28. Id. (citing Litton, 15 F.3d at 794-95).
29. Dyno Constr. Co. v. McWane, Inc., 198 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 1999).
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However, the Eighth Circuit, in White Consolidated Industries v. Mc-
Gill Manufacturing Co., Inc., found that the quotation in that case was the
offer because it not only covered the essential terms, but indicated that the
quote was made for immediate acceptance by the buyer.3 0 "Because Mc-
Gill manifested a 'clear, definite and explicit' offer of sale, the price quota-
tion qualifies as a valid offer."31 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has noted that
"a price quotation may suffice for an offer if it is sufficiently detailed and it
'reasonably appear[s] from the price quotation that assent to that quotation
is all that is needed to ripen the offer into a contract.' "32 So in some cases
the seller's quotation may be found to have been the offer.
Yet, make no mistake that the tendency of the courts appears to be to
find that a seller's quotation is not a final offer capable of being accepted as
a final contract in the absence of clear language in the quotation stating in
no uncertain terms that it is, in fact, an offer for immediate and final ac-
ceptance by the buyer that will create a binding contract. The Eighth Cir-
cuit in Litton emphasized the limited nature of most sellers' quotations:
We ruled that the mining company's refusal to sell the
equipment did not rise to the level of a breach of contract.
We reasoned that "[t]he mere description of merchandise,
coupled with the purchase terms, is not, in itself, sufficient
to constitute a legally valid offer." Without a "manifesta-
tion of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to
justify another person in understanding that his assent to
that bargain is invited and will conclude it," there was no
contract to breach. 33
Once again, the difference between whether a quotation is a definite
offer or a mere invitation to deal further will likely turn on whether the
quotation is sufficiently detailed, explicitly states that it is for immediate
acceptance, and states that acceptance will create a contract. After all, the
seller may have shotgunned unsigned quotations in a mailing to many po-
tential buyers, not intending to be bound by the quotations without further
direct negotiations that would address the buyer's specific needs, including
details as to the schedule, place and means of deliveries, as well as any
other special requirements of the buyer. Most often one would expect the
buyer to reply to the seller's quotation by setting forth the final detailed
terms specific to the individual buyer's needs in a purchase order.
In Litton, for example, the court noted a number of open terms that
the seller's quotation did not address that precluded its consideration as an
offer:
30. White, 165 F.3d at 1190.
31. Id.
32. Dyno Constr , 198 F.3d at 572.
33. Litton, 15 F.3d at 794-95 (internal citations omitted).
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There is, of course, little question that both the price letters
and catalogs were clear, definite, and explicit, but it is diffi-
cult to maintain that they left "nothing open for negotia-
tion." When and where might the parts listed be delivered?
Was Litton obligated to purchase all the parts listed in the
quantities listed, or might they be able to purchase just what
was necessary to fill their needs by picking and choosing
from the parts listed? Could Litton feel justified, based on
the quotation letters alone, in finding Leviton [seller] in
breach of contract if Leviton were to be unable to fill any
purchase order submitted? 34
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Dyno, found that a seller's quotation was
not an offer where the word "Estimate" was printed at the top of the docu-
ment, and the fax sheet transmitted with it stated, "Please call." 35
These words are indicative of an invitation to engage in fu-
ture negotiations rather than an offer to enter into a con-
tract. Although both price lists set forth descriptions of
materials, prices, and quantities, nothing was stated about
the place of delivery, time of performance, or terms of
payment.36
It is true that § 75-2-204(3) provides that not all terms must be agreed
upon for there to be a definite contract, stating: "even though one or more
terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy."37
However, the court in Litton, while acknowledging that all terms need
not have been provided to create a contract, emphasized that it still would
not find a quotation was an offer inviting a contract by mere acceptance
where terms were left open. The court stated: "Without definite and af-
firmative answers to the foregoing questions, however, and perhaps to
some others, Leviton's price letters and catalogs amount to no more than
'the mere description of merchandise, coupled with the purchase
terms . .. 0.' "38
It is important to understand, as well, that a seller's quotation may be
sufficiently detailed to appear to be an offer, including, for example, a de-
tailed schedule for deliveries to the buyer, and specific payment terms (e.g.
payment due 30 days from invoice). Yet the quotation could still fail le-
gally to be considered an offer. How? The quotation will become spoiled
as an offer, however detailed it may be, if the quotation (or the cover letter
34. Id. at 795.
35. 198 F.3d at 573-74.
36. Id. at 574.
37. Miss. CODE AsmN. § 75-2-204(3) (2010).
38. Litton, 15 F.3d at 795.
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accompanying it, for that matter) anticipates the receipt of additional terms
from the buyer for the seller's review and acceptance. In Mantaline Corpo-
ration v. PPG Industries, Inc., the court found that a quotation was not an
offer because of the following language:
This proposal is for immediate acceptance only and is sub-
ject to change at any time before orders are accepted by us.
This proposal and our acceptance of your orders, signed by a
representative of our Company, together with your order,
constitutes the entire contract between us. 3 9
The court found that despite the language that "[t]his proposal is for imme-
diate acceptance only" the rest of the language reserving to the seller final
acceptance of a purchase order conditioned on the seller's signature was
"forward-looking language" that rendered the quotation nothing more
than an "invitation to deal." 40 Thus, a seller's quotation will not be con-
strued as an offer if it contains any language looking ahead to receipt of
additional terms from the buyer for the seller's review and negotiation. As
the court stated in Mataline, to be a firm offer, a price quotation must be
"so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to
that bargain is invited and will conclude it."4 1 The court then went on to
find that the buyer's detailed purchase order was the offer, and that the
seller had accepted all the terms of the purchase order as the controlling
contract by shipment of the goods.4 2
Ultimately, whether a price quotation is deemed to be just an invita-
tion to deal further (the usual case) or an offer that the buyer could have
accepted to form a contract:
... depends primarily upon the intention of the person com-
municating the quotation as demonstrated by all of the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances. Thus, to constitute an
offer, a price quotation must be made under circumstances
evidencing the express or implied intent of the offeror that
its acceptance shall constitute a binding contract. 4 3
In some cases the courts have found quotations to be offers." How-
ever, one should note that in those cases not only were the seller's quota-
tions sufficiently detailed and tailored to the buyer's delivery schedule to
39. No. 97-4473, 2000 WL 799337, at *1 (6th Cir. June 8, 2000) (unpublished table decision)
(applying Ohio law) (emphasis added).
40. Id. at *1, *3.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Dyno Constr, 198 F.3d at 572.
44. See, e.g. Reaction Molding Techs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(concerning quotation containing detailed payment and delivery terms); see also Loranger Plastics
Corp. v. Incoe Corp., 670 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (stating quotation was "subject to acceptance
without modification within 30 days" from issuance."); Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761
F.2d 1117, 1121 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding offer where seller's executed letter proposals which promised to
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be offers, but they did not contain the "forward-looking" language, looking
ahead to the receipt of additional terms from the buyer that spoiled the
quotation as an offer as in Mantaline. Again, for the quotation to be an
offer, the offer cannot contain language that would make it appear to be
just part of an ongoing negotiation process that would not conclude merely
by the buyer's acceptance of the quotation.
In Hohenberg Brothers Co. v. Killebrew, a Fifth Circuit case out of
Mississippi, the court found that a farmer's one page "purchase and sales
agreement" form covering the sale of his expected cotton crop at a stated
price, although not addressed to any particular buyer, was specifically per-
formable against the farmer who later attempted to disavow it.45 In that
case, the farmer, through his agent, executed his own one page agreement
and shopped it to a willing buyer, who, in addition to sending the farmer its
standard-form, three page purchase form, also executed and signed the
farmer's one page agreement. Presumably, the price of cotton went higher
than the farmer's original agreement had called for, giving the buyer a
windfall, and the farmer tried to get out of the agreement.4 6 The court
concluded that the farmer should "not be heard to complain of enforce-
ment of the precise agreement to which he signified his unconditional com-
mitment by the execution of the one-page purchase and sale agreement."4 7
In Killebrew, the fact that the one page agreement was not only denomi-
nated as a purchase and sales agreement (not just a quote), undoubtedly
contributed to the court's finding that the one page agreement had been
proposed as an offer the farmer became stuck with. Further, the agree-
ment had been proposed with all blanks filled in except the buyer's name,
which the buyer then supplied upon its execution of the document, signify-
ing the buyer's acceptance of the terms.4 8 It is just such a result that leads
many sellers to stick to the more limited language of a quotation that will
give them a chance to review the buyer's order as an offer, together with
any intervening changes in market costs that may require further negotia-
tion, rather than as an acceptance once it comes in.
Nonetheless, if a manufacturer or other seller wishes to increase the
likelihood that its quotation form will be deemed later by a reviewing court
to have expressed the terms of a firm offer for immediate acceptance by
the buyer, it should do the following:
sell at listed prices, and the buyer's purchase orders or responsive phone calls were acceptances); Mead
Corp. v. McNally-Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 654 F.2d 1197, 1203 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding proposal was an
offer where it offered prices and delivery schedules, and its terms were incorporated into buyer's
purchase order which was the acceptance).
45. 505 F.2d 643, 646 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding "where a party receives a writing containing essen-
tial terms identical to those expressed in a previously executed contract proposal, that party has a duty
to speak out if he does not intend to be bound by the terms he proposed. Failing in this duty, his silence
constitutes an estoppel").
46. Id. at 644.
47. Id. at 646.
4 8. Id.
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* State explicitly in the quotation that the quotation is an offer sub-
ject to acceptance without modification by the buyer within a lim-
ited period of time (e.g. 30 days) from issuance, and that the
buyer's acceptance will result in the immediate creation of a final,
binding contract between the parties.
* If the seller really means for a quotation to be an offer, then the
seller should include on the quotation form a place for its signature
(e.g. "authorized by ") and have a place for the buyer to ac-
knowledge its acceptance by signature.
* Avoid using the word "estimate" in connection with the quotation.
* Avoid any "forward-looking" language in either the quotation,
(and just as importantly!) in the cover letter, or in the fax sheet or
e-mail accompanying the quotation, that would anticipate the later
receipt or review for approval by the seller of additional terms and
conditions from the buyer in the form of a purchase order, phone
calls, or other communications.
* Include in the quotation fully negotiated, detailed terms for prices,
materials, quantities, place of delivery, times of delivery, means of
delivery, payment due dates, and any specifications, design or test-
ing criteria, or industry standards that would be expected in the
industry to be recited and met for the equipment or product
involved.
* Scrutinize and take exception to any terms later received from the
buyer that do not conform to the terms of the quotation, referenc-
ing back to the terms of the quotation as the applicable terms of an
offer that was provided for the buyer's acceptance.
Given the apparent inclination of courts to leave the buyer in control
of the offer through purchase order forms, a manufacturer in any case can-
not afford to rely simply on its quotation, while ignoring conflicting or ob-
jectionable terms in a buyer's purchase order. It is the obligation of the
manufacturer's contract personnel to review the buyer's purchase order to
object to terms that would impose burdens the seller has no intention as-
suming or that would conflict with standards and requirements in the quo-
tation. Further, a manufacturer may find that it would be better off not
attempting to make its quotation into an offer (which might or might not
be construed as an offer in any case). Instead, the manufacturer must rely
on a thorough review of the buyer's purchase order, and on the taking of
exception in writing to any objectionable terms. Manufacturers take note:
carefully scrutinize a buyer's purchase offer to scrub out any objectionable
terms in the purchase order by striking through them and returning the
purchase order to the buyer fully noting the objections right on the
purchase order (although keeping a good copy). Otherwise, the manufac-
turer will find itself likely stuck with the buyer's purchase order terms even
though the buyer's terms contradict the seller's original quotation terms.
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Nor, given the inclination of courts to find that the seller's quote was a
mere estimate or invitation to deal or negotiate further, rather than a con-
tract document, should a manufacturer or other seller think that it can rely
solely on the quote as the memorandum of the deal. If the buyer does not
follow up with a purchase order, and if the manufacturer for its part does
not follow up with a written confirmation of the terms of the deal after the
buyer's verbal acceptance of its quote (and, in the absence of some docu-
ment of the buyer, like an e-mail, acknowledging the deal at the contract
price in addition to a verbal assent to the quote) the seller may find it
cannot enforce the contract price it originally quoted. The quote alone is
not enough: as noted earlier, there is a statute of frauds for the sale of
goods over $500 under the UCC that requires a written acknowledgement
of the deal by the buyer if the seller is attempting to enforce the transaction
at an agreed-upon price against the buyer.49
Following receipt of a purchase order, also, the manufacturer can still
attempt to add terms to the contract that one would ordinarily expect (such
as the addition of interest terms applicable to overdue accounts and rea-
sonable attorneys fees and costs of collection) by sending an acknowledge-
ment form to the buyer, thanking him for the purchase order, but noting
the additional, usual penalties for late payment included in the acknowl-
edgement form.5 0
VI. IF THE BUYER'S PURCHASE ORDER IS THE OFFER, IS THE
SELLER'S SHIPMENT AN ACCEPTANCE OF ITS TERMS?
Sellers should beware that the mere act of shipping conforming goods
may be construed as acceptance of all of the terms of the buyer's purchase
order. As we have seen in Mantaline, the court found that the seller's quo-
tation was a mere invitation to deal, not an offer, because it contained for-
ward-looking language anticipating receipt of the buyer's purchase order."'
The court then found that the buyer's purchase order did qualify as an offer
to the seller under traditional contract analysis, and that, by its terms it
invited acceptance by the seller's prompt shipment of conforming goods.5 2
Further, the court in Mantaline noted that § 2-206 of the UCC also pro-
vides that a seller's acceptance of a contract can be demonstrated by the
seller's shipment." In Mississippi, the relevant statute provides:
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the lan-
guage or circumstances
49. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-201 (2010).
50. See infra Part XIII.
51. Mantaline Corp. v. PPG Indus., No. 97-4473, 2000 WL 799337, at *3 (6th Cir. June 8, 2000).
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.09 (west 2000) (Omno REV. CODE ANNm. § 1302.09
is the equivalent of UCC § 2-206.).
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(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in
the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or cur-
rent shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance by
either a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current
shipping of conforming or nonconforming goods.54
In Mantaline, the court reasoned that the seller's shipment was an accept-
ance of the terms of the buyer's purchase order, including the buyer's arbi-
tration and indemnification provisions.55
VII. IF THE SELLER'S QUOTATION IS THE OFFER, IS IT IRREVOCABLE?
If the seller's price quotation is sufficiently definite to create an offer
to the buyer, the seller's list prices may be irrevocable and binding on the
seller for up to three months under the right circumstances. 5 6 The code
section entitled "Firm Offers," § 75-2-205, states:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writ-
ing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held
open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the
time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but
in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three
(3) months; but any such term of assurance on a form sup-
plied by the offeree must be separately signed by the
offeror.57
In Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's Inc., a meat supplier, Mid-
South Packers, submitted a letter "Proposal" to the Shoney's restaurant
chain listing prices at which it would be willing to sell meat to the restau-
rants.58 The letter, by its terms, was vague in that it "contained neither
quantity nor durational terms[,]" and provided that Shoney's would be in-
formed forty-five days prior to any change in prices. 5 9 Shoney's never ex-
plicitly assented or rejected the terms of the seller's proposal, but within a
few months it began purchasing meat from Mid-South.6 0 Shoney's sent a
series of purchase orders to Mid-South. 6 ' Just four months after sending
out the price quotation, Mid-South Packers, without warning, announced
that it was increasing its prices by ten cents per pound due to a computa-
tional error in the original "proposal."6 2 After discussions, Mid-South
54. Miss. CODE ANN.§ 75-2-206 (2010).
55. Mantaline, 2000 WL 799337 at *3.
56. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-205 (2010).
57. Id
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agreed to only increase the price by seven cents per pound.63 Shoney's
neither agreed to nor rejected the new prices; nothing was ever formalized
in a written contract.t
Shoney's continued to send purchase orders to Mid-South Packers for
some months thereafter but then shorted a payment to Mid-South by the
amounts it had been charged above the prices originally quoted by Mid-
South in its initial letter "Proposal."65 In determining the legal status of
the original sales "Proposal" letter, the Fifth Circuit found that Shoney's
breached its agreement with Mid-South when it sent the short payment and
that it had no right to offset the seller's higher prices.6 6 Analyzing the
transaction under § 75-2-205, the court found that Mid-South's original
sales quotation was, at most, a "firm offer" that remained irrevocable de-
spite a lack of consideration for three months at most, as provided by the
statute.6 7 The court also held that "each purchase order stood on its own as
a contract between Shoney's and Mid-South" that Shoney's accepted each
time it issued a purchase order or verbal telephone order. 6 8
However, a merchant's offer becomes irrevocable for up to three
months only if there is language in the offer indicating it is to be held
open.6 9 In Ivey's Plumbing Electric v. Petrochem Maintenance, the court
stated:
It is settled by explicit provision of Uniform Commercial
Code that a merchant's quotation, or estimate, or other of-
fer, to be irrevocable for a reasonable length of time, must
[b]y its terms give assurance that it will be held open.
MIss.CODE ANN. § 75-2-205 (1972). Otherwise, a mere of-
fer lacking such assurance is subject to revocation by the
seller at any time prior to the buyer's acceptance. 70
The court also noted that the buyer's reliance on prices alone will not make
the seller's quotation into an irrevocable firm offer.71
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1119-20.
66. Id. at 1122.
67. Id. at 1121.
68. Id.
69. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-205 (2010) ("An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a
signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may
such period of irrevocability exceed three (3) months; but any such term of assurance on a form sup-
plied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.").
70. 463 F. Supp. 543, 551 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 551 n.4.
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VIII. THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN DETERMINING THE SCOPE
OF A SALES CONTRACT UNDER THE UCC
Is it the role of the judge to be the interpreter of the parties' contract?
Normally, "[d]etermination of a contract's terms is a question of law." 72 In
the case of sales contracts the UCC's encompassing body of law governs all
conceivable aspects of a sales transaction and supplies any gaps for omitted
terms, leaving little room for ambiguity. Therefore, it is especially likely
that a court will find that scope of a sales contract should be a question of
law under the UCC for the court rather than for a jury to decide. The Sixth
Circuit, for example, has noted the special role of the UCC as a guide to a
court's determination of a contract's scope:
Absent the Code, questions of contract formation and in-
tent remain factual issues to be resolved by the fact-finder
after careful review of the evidence. However, the Code
provides rules of law, and Section 2-207 establishes impor-
tant legal principles to be employed to resolve complex con-
tract disputes arising from the exchange of business forms.
Section 2-207 was intended to provide some degree of cer-
tainty in this otherwise ambiguous area of contract law. In
our view, it is unreasonable and contrary to the policy be-
hind the Code merely to turn the issue over to the unin-
formed speculation of the jury left to apply its own
particular sense of equity.73
Further, in the usual case it is undisputed as to what forms have been
exchanged. Oral communications may cause more problems, though. 74
Even so, the statute of frauds requires that contracts for the sale of goods
over $500 be evidenced by a memorandum in writing.7 Therefore, even if
a sale of goods contract begins with oral communications, a merchant
should know that within a reasonable time a written confirmation of the
oral agreement's terms will have to be presented to the other party in order
for the contract to be enforceable.7 The strict statute of frauds require-
ment for sales contracts makes it more likely that the communications lead-
ing up to the formation of the contract will be undisputed, and therefore,
72. United States ex rel. Control Sys., Inc. v. Arundel Corp., 814 F.2d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 1987); see
also Fairly v. Turan-Foley Imps., Inc., 65 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Questions of the validity, en-
forceability, and construction of contracts-whether the parties have satisfied the law's formal require-
ments-are committed to the court as distinguished from the trier of facts.") (citing Leach v. Tingle, 586
So. 2d 799, 801 (Miss. 1991)).
73. Mead Corp. v. McNally-Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 654 F.2d 1197, 1206 (6th Cir. 1981) (internal
citations omitted).
74. See, e.g., R.C. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Nat'l Office Sys., Inc., 622 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Miss. 1993)
("The existence of an oral contract is a fact issue.").
75. Miss. CODE AmN. § 75-2-201(1) (2010).
76. See § 75-2-201(2) (sending a written confirmation by merchant within reasonable time satis-
fies UCC statute of frauds if not objected to by the other party within ten days of the receipt of the
confirmation).
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the contract's scope will be a question of law for the court to consider-as a
summary judgment issue under Rule 56 of either the federal or state rules
of civil procedure.
IX. PURPOSE OF MISSISSIPPI UCC § 75-2-207
As previously discussed, the issue of finding a legally-binding offer
amid the contemporaneous exchange of forms that is the norm in modern
commercial life can be a difficult thing to determine, even for experienced
commercial litigators. However, the complexity is only heightened when
the terms of acceptance in these transactions differ from those of the offer.
When this happens, in a transaction for the sale of goods, we have the "bat-
tle of the forms" situation, the bane of many a student of the UCC. The
"battle of the forms" provision appears at § 2-207 of the UCC, which is
entitled "Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.""
The UCC's 2-207 provision presents a departure from the old common
law "mirror image" rule, under which a court would find that there was no
contract at all unless the acceptance mirrored the offer precisely.7 The
authors of the Code found that in the real world of sales transactions, for
example, the seller might attempt to both accept the buyer's purchase or-
der by sending out an acknowledgement form thanking the buyer for the
order while simultaneously insisting that terms on the back of the acknowl-
edgement form apply even though they are different from or additional to
the terms of the purchase order.79
However, the Code expresses a reluctance to find that the seller's ac-
knowledgement form can easily turn what would have been an acceptance
into a "take it or leave it" counteroffer. A counteroffer, if not accepted,
would destroy the contract even though the parties are likely to have begun
performance by the time a problem arises.8 o Rather, the Code sets forth
criteria in its Battle of the Forms provision, under which additional or dif-
ferent terms may or may not become part of the contract, depending on the
facts, while maintaining the viability of the contract. 8 ' The ultimate pur-
pose of the Battle of the Forms provision, though, is not simply to maintain
the integrity of the parties' agreement where the acceptance may not ex-
actly mirror the offer, but, more importantly, to help answer what the
terms and scope of the contract are.82
77. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-207 (2010).
78. See generally, Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1231-37 (1982).
79. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 947 F.2d 1333, 1335 (7th Cir. 1991)
(noting that "the 'mirror image' rule" was "widely believed to take insufficient account of the incorrigi-
ble fallibility of human beings engaged in commercial as in other dealings").
80. See § 2-207(1) ("A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms addi-
tional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional
on assent to the additional or different terms") (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-207 cmt. 1 (stating that the statute is dealing with two common
situations in commercial life: "The one is the written confirmation, where an agreement has been
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X. REVIEW OF THE TEXT OF MISSISSIPPI UCC § 75-2-207
The Code section addresses three areas: (1) an acceptance versus a
counteroffer; (2) the terms of a contract where one agreeing to a contract
attempts to add terms in the acceptance or confirmation (the "battle of the
forms" provision); and (3) the terms of a contract if it is formed in the end
only by conduct recognizing the existence of the contract by shipment and
acceptance of goods." The full text of § 75-2-207 reads:
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms addi-
tional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, un-
less acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals
for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms
become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of
the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence
of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale al-
though the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish
a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties
agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated
under any other provisions of this code.84
Thus subsection 2-207(2) automatically includes additional terms in the
contract found in an acceptance or confirmation if it is one between
"merchants" and criteria are met of § 75-2-207. Who is a merchant? The
Code defines a "merchant" as one who deals "in goods of the kind.""
reached either orally or by informal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both
of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms
not discussed. The other situation is offer and acceptance, in which a wire or letter expressed and




85. Miss. CODE AtmN. § 75-2-104 (2010).
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XI. CAN THE SELLER TAKE CONTROL BY INSISTING THAT ITS
ACCEPTANCE OF THE BUYER'S ORDER Is EXPRESSLY CONDITIONAL ON
ADHERENCE TO THE TERMS OF AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT?
A. Finding an Acceptance Is Favored Over Finding
a Counteroffer: § 75-2-207(1)
Assuming, as the courts indicate is often the case, the buyer's purchase
order is the offer, can the seller take control of the deal by issuing an ac-
knowledgement form that states that the seller's acceptance is expressly
conditional on the buyer's adherence to terms that are different from or
additional to the terms found in the buyer's earlier purchase order? In
other words, can the seller readily turn his acceptance form into a
counteroffer?
As we have seen, the policy of the drafters of the UCC is to preserve
the parties' expression of their contract in the exchange of forms by turning
a common law counteroffer where possible into contract acceptance.8" The
policy of the UCC, at least as expressed by a number of courts, appears to
favor allowing the buyer through a purchase order to retain control over
the basic terms of an offer to purchase goods. However, under the Battle
of the Forms provision of 2-207(2), the seller, who is in the business of
satisfying buyers' needs, at least can propose additional or different terms
as part of an acceptance, but the new terms will become part of the con-
tract only if they would not unduly surprise the buyer who may not read
the acknowledgement form, and if they would not materially alter the es-
sential terms of the offer of the buyer's purchase order."
The likelihood that a seller's acknowledgement form will be found to
be an acceptance, even if it attempts to state different or additional terms
to the contract, rather than a counteroffer that does away with considera-
tion of the buyer's form, is apparent from a reading of the statute:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms addi-
tional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, un-
less acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms.88
The courts are reluctant to find, in the words of § 75-2-207(1), that "an
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or dif-
ferent terms." As White and Summers state in their authoritative commen-
tary on the Uniform Commercial Code:
But under the cases so far, this language is not easily in-
voked. The offeree must state a counteroffer very
86. See Miss. CODEs ANN. § 75-2-201(1) (2010).
87. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-207 (2010).
88. § 75-2-207(1).
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clearly.... Courts routinely characterize even deviant doc-
uments as acceptances and not as counteroffers as a way of
preventing surprise to the original offeror who may not
have read the claimed counterofferor's form-an "anti-last-
shot" policy.8 9
For example, in Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Diamond International Corp.,
the court found that the terms in an acceptance would not create a counter-
offer unless there were a clearly expressed unwillingness to continue with
the contract without the additional or different terms.90 Similarly, in
Daitcom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., the court held that an acceptance stating
only that it was expressly limited to its terms was not expressly conditional
because it did not state an unwillingness to form a contract without the
additional terms. 91
B. A Buyer's Acceptance of Goods Is Not an Agreement
to a Counteroffer: § 75-2-207(3)
Even if the seller manages to make its acknowledgement form into a
counteroffer that is expressly conditional on the buyer's acceptance of new
or different terms, the courts appear reluctant to find that the buyer can
unwittingly accept the counteroffer merely by accepting the seller's ship-
ment of the goods, without having expressly accepted the counteroffer.
Thus, White and Summers states: "Most courts under the Code hold that
such an 'acceptance' merely by conduct does not constitute 'assent' within
the meaning of § 75-2-207(1) . . . ." Instead, the UCC indicates that al-
though a contract is created by the conduct of the parties in shipping and
accepting goods, the seller's attempts to impose new or different terms by a
genuine, but unaccepted counteroffer will not follow from the buyer's mere
acceptance of the goods. The third subsection of the statute reads as
follows:
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence
of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale al-
though the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish
a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties
89. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SALES, §§ 1-3 at 16
(4th ed. 1995) (emphasis original); see also Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643, 646 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("Section 2-207(1) . . . rejects the common law mirror image rule and converts what under
the common law would have been a counteroffer into an acceptance or confirmation even though the
acceptance or confirmation includes terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon.").
90. 833 F.2d 1210, 1214 (6th Cir. 1987).
91. 741 F.2d 1569, 1577 (10th Cir. 1984); see also United States ex rel. Control Sys. v. Arundel
Corp., 814 F.2d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 1987) (construing acknowledgement form narrowly so as to not con-
flict with buyer's order form).
92. WarrE & SUMMERs, supra note 89, at 16.
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agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated
under any other provisions of this code."
Thus, the new, materially different terms of the seller's unaccepted
counteroffer would fall by the wayside under § 75-2-207(3) because those
terms did not agree with the terms of the buyer's offer in the purchase
order.
All this means that it may be difficult for a seller to come up with a
preprinted acceptance/acknowledgement form that the seller can count on
in each case to take control of the terms of the contract away from the
buyer who has submitted a purchase order as an offer for acceptance. As
noted earlier, the seller's best defense to unacceptable terms in a buyer's
purchase order is to be sure that its person in charge of reviewing contracts
for the seller goes over the fine print of the purchase order very carefully,
marks out objectionable provisions, and sends them back to the buyer with
a request for changes to the buyer's form (while keeping a good copy of the
marked-up form for his records). The seller should withhold any accept-
ance of the buyer's purchase order until the changes are made by the buyer
to its form.
C. A Seller Should Treat the Buyer's Order Acknowledgement
Form with Caution
A buyer may present to the seller as part of its purchase order an
order acknowledgement form to sign and send back. The seller's acknowl-
edgment in the buyer's form typically not only provides for acknowledge-
ment of the receipt of the purchase order, but also acceptance of all the
terms of the purchase order. Thus, the seller who objects to terms in a
purchase order must be careful not to sign and return the preprinted order
acknowledgement form that may accompany the buyer's purchase order's
terms. If the seller, for example, does not read the buyer's purchase order
later but comes to the conclusion that the purchase order form represents a
material alteration of an earlier oral agreement between the parties, giving
him an argument under the battle of the forms provisions of § 75-2-207(2),
the seller waives that argument by signing the buyer's acknowledgement
form stating the seller has expressly agreed to and accepted the materially-
altering terms within the purchase order.94
Therefore, a seller must be careful to review and object to terms of a
buyer's purchase order and to not waive such objections by signing and
returning the buyer's acknowledgement form without comment. Indeed,
many sellers, rather than using the buyer's acknowledgement form, will
send instead the seller's own acknowledgement form that insists on the ap-
plication of new or different terms from those of the buyer's purchase or-
der form. Those additional terms of the seller may come into the contract
under the right circumstances sanctioned by § 75-2-207.
93. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-207(3) (Rev. 2002).
94. See WHITE & SUMMERs, supra note 89, §§ 1-3 at 19 n.19.
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XII. ADDITION OF TERMS TO AN ACCEPTANCE OR
CONFIRMATION: § 75-2-207(2)
A. The Addition of Terms Between Merchants Can Be Automatic
One who wishes to accept or confirm an offer for a contract cannot
always "have his cake and eat it too" by attempting to recognize the con-
tract in an acceptance or confirmation while simultaneously coming close
to making a counteroffer by insisting that additional or different terms in-
cluded with his form must be complied with. Rather, unless the offeree has
made a genuine counteroffer (stating clearly he is not willing to form a
contract without an express acceptance of his new terms) the terms the
offeree attempts to add in acceptance or confirmation may or may not be-
come part of the contract depending on the application of legal criteria set
forth in the battle of the forms provision. The battle of the forms provision
directs that "[t]he additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract."9 5 By operation of law, "such terms become part
of the contract unless" three exceptions apply: "(a) the offer expressly lim-
its acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c)
notification of objection to them has already been given within a reasona-
ble time after notice of them is received." 96
B. Merchants Defined
A "merchant" is one who deals in "goods of the kind," and "[b]etween
merchants" means parties "chargeable with the knowledge or skill of
merchants."97 Thus, an acceptance or confirmation "between merchants"
may automatically add terms to a contract unless the exceptions apply, but
not if the contract is between a merchant and a retail consumer. 98
C. Confirmations
The battle of the forms provision covers the addition of terms included
in confirmations of oral agreements as well as acceptances. A confirmation
is a form of acceptance. The Fifth Circuit has explained the role of confir-
mations to evidence terms that were earlier agreed to in oral conversations:
The written confirmation is recognized primarily as a writ-
ing necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds when the agree-
ment reached is at least partially unenforceable for lack of a
writing; this appears to be the primary basis for permitting a
written confirmation to act as an acceptance under § 75-2-
207(1). We think this rationale properly applies to contracts
that are partly oral, i.e., the offer is oral and the acceptance
95. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-207(2) (2010).
96. Id.
97. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-104 (2010).
98. § 75-2-207(2).
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written, so long as the written acceptance does not purport
to contain the entire agreement.99
Thus, a memorandum sent by a merchant to satisfy the statute of frauds
following oral discussions as permitted by § 75-2-201(2) would be a confir-
mation to which a merchant might also attempt to add new or additional
terms that would become part of the contract if not objected to and if they
meet the criteria for addition set forth in the battle of the forms provision.
Further, in Shoney's, the court found that invoices sent by the seller consti-
tuted confirmations subject to analysis under the battle of the forms provi-
sion where the buyer's purchase orders "did not purport to contain all of
the terms of the agreement" and where the seller's invoices constituted the
only writings rendering the contract enforceable against the seller under
the UCC statute of frauds.ioo
XIII. ExCLUSION OF MATERIALLY ALTERING TERMS
The primary exception to terms that can be added automatically by an
acceptance or confirmation exchanged between merchants are terms that
would "materially alter" the agreement.' 0 The drafters of the Code ex-
plained that an added clause would "materially alter" the contract when it
would "result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express
awareness by the other party."10 2 Examples of material alterations can in-
clude the following: clauses negating a standard's warranties of
merchantability and fitness; clauses requiring that complaints be made in a
materially shorter time than reasonable or customary in the industry; con-
tract cancellation clauses for untimely payment of invoices; indemnification
clauses; limitations of liability clauses; and arbitration clauses.' 0 3 A strong
indication that a term is a material alteration is if it is contrary to industry
practice or trade usage for the provision of goods involved. 0 4 Another
gauge of materiality is whether the proposed addition to the contract is
"sufficiently material to require express conversation between the parties
over its inclusion or exclusion in the contract." 0 5
There are two Mississippi cases that touch on the issue of material
alteration, both dealing with terms added to the seller's invoices. In Mid-
South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., the court found terms included in the
seller's invoices requiring the buyer to pay interest on late payments and
reasonable collection costs, including attorney's fees "became 'part of the
contract' " under the battle of the forms provision of § 75-2-207(2). The
buyer had not contended that the exceptions to the battle of the forms
99. Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal cita-
tion omitted).
100. Id. at 1123-24.
101. § 75-2-207(2)(b).
102. § 75-2-207 cmt. 4 (emphasis added).
103. See id.; see also WHITE & SUMMERs, supra note 89, §§1-3 at 18 n.36.
104. WHITE & SUMMERS supra note 89, at 15 n.24.
105. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.w.2d 414, 425 (Wis. 1973).
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provision applied to those terms.'0 6 In American Cable Corp. v. Trilogy
Communications, Inc., the court noted that an invoice could add terms to a
contract, and that a seller's invoices for goods sent in response to, and in
confirmation of, an oral order could add a clause stating that the law of
Mississippi and the venue of Mississippi courts would apply to the parties
in the event of a dispute.' 0 7 As the court noted, the buyer sent no objec-
tion to the terms added by the seller's invoices. 08 The court's discussion of
§ 75-2-207(2) did not find that the choice-of-law and venue provisions were
material alterations to the oral contract previously made for the goods to
be manufactured in Mississippi for later shipment to the buyer.109
Indeed, courts have found that the following terms added to a seller's
acceptances or confirmations are not material alterations because they
should not come as a surprise to the buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness: interest, finance charges, costs and attorney's fees for collection;110
choice of law provisions;"' requirement that complaints be made in a rea-
sonably timely fashion;112 force majure clauses;"23 and clauses limiting re-
jection for defects which fall within customary trade tolerances but
providing for an adjustment or other limited remedy."14
The reason for automatically excluding materially altering terms under
the battle of the forms provision from an acceptance or confirmation is to
preserve the essential terms of a firm offer or prior oral agreement. As one
court has stated:
Section 2207 [Michigan's UCC § 2-207] proceeds on the as-
sumption that businessmen frequently reach firm oral un-
derstandings not instantly reduced to writing and signed;
that it is commonplace for one or both to confirm such un-
derstandings in writing; that not infrequently the writings
differ but the parties, nevertheless, commence performance,
impelled to do so by the exigencies of the business world.
The policy of section 2207 is that the parties should be able
to enforce their agreement, whatever it is, despite discrep-
ancies between the oral agreement and the confirmation (or
between an offer and acceptance) if enforcement can be
granted without requiring either party to be bound to a ma-
terial term to which he has not agreed. . . . Under section
106. Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1124 (5th Cir. 1985).
107. 754 So. 2d 545, 551 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Mid-South Packers, 761 F.2d at 1123).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See e.g., Mid-South Packers, Inc., 761 F.2d at 1124 (holding seller's confirmatory invoices
adding interest, costs and attorney's fees becoming part of contract); accord Am. Cable Corp., 754 So.
2d at 551; Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-207 cmt. 5.
111. WHTTE & SUMMERS, Supra note 89, at 15 n.27.
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2207, a party, except a merchant in the case of an immate-
rial term, may ignore additional terms, and proceed with
performance of the agreement actually negotiated by the
parties without fear that such performance will be inter-
preted by court or jury as acceptance of the other party's
additional terms. 115
Further, "[t]he drafters of the Code intended to preserve an agreement, as
it was originally conceived by the parties, in the face of additional material
terms included in the standard forms exchanged by merchants in the nor-
mal course of dealings."116 Hence, the drafters included the automatic ex-
clusion in the battle of the forms provision of material alterations that
would result in "surprise or hardship" if added to the terms of the offer or
to a previously reached oral agreement by a written acceptance or
confirmation. 117
After all, it is the policy of the UCC that businessmen should not be
caught by the addition of materially altering terms in an acceptance or con-
firmation that no one will read until something goes wrong:
The drafters of the Code . . . intended to change the com-
mon law in an attempt to conform contract law to modern
day business transactions. They believed that businessmen
rarely read the terms on the back of standardized forms and
that the common law, therefore, unduly rewarded the party
who sent the last form prior to the shipping of the goods.
The Code disfavors any attempt by one party to unilaterally
impose conditions that would create hardship on another
party. Thus, before a counteroffer is accepted, the counter-
offeree must expressly assent to the new terms.11 8
XIV. THE BATTLE BETWEEN CONFLICTING CONFIRMATION FORMS
What if, following an oral agreement between buyer and seller that
covers the essential terms of a contract, both parties send written confirma-
tions that happen to conflict? White and Summers offers the following
analysis:
When a confirmation states a term different from the origi-
nal oral or other informal agreement, the different term falls
out. The benchmark for determining additionalness or dif-
ferentness is the prior agreement, not the other confirma-
tion form. Thus, if a supplier of metal and a purchaser
115. Am. Parts Co., Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n., 154 N.W.2d 5, 12, 15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
116. Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 524 F. Supp. 546, 550 (D. Del. 1981) (citation
omitted).
117. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-207 cmt. 4.
118. Leonard Pevar Co., 524 F. Supp at 551 (emphasis added).
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orally agree to the sale of a set quantity of brass at a firm
price of $1.17 per pound, that will be the contract price not-
withstanding a different price in one of the two confirming
forms. .. . If the seller responds with a confirmation of a
term not in the informal agreement and the buyer's confir-
mation states a conflicting term, the two knock each other
out. Comment 6, however, provides that if Article 2's gap
fillers then supply a term, it is binding.' 1 9
Thus, just as material alterations fall out of written acceptances and confir-
mations automatically by operation of law under § 75-2-207, so too do con-
flicting terms fall out of competing confirmations of an oral contract. That
is, if the two confirmations do not agree on what was said, the differences
fall out; it is the original oral agreement that governs.
What if one party attempts to make the terms of his confirmation of an
oral agreement stick in place of the other party's confirmation by making
his confirmation "expressly conditional" on the other party's agreement to
new or different terms? White and Summers offers a steady line of cases,
stating that a confirmation of an oral agreement cannot be made "expressly
conditional" on additional or different terms because, "[a] party should not
be able to escape an oral contract through a confirmation." 20 In other
words, one cannot turn a confirmation of an oral contract into a genuine
counteroffer that, if not accepted, would end the contract.
An illustration of a case in which one party sent in a confirmation that
contained a material alteration that the court rejected is Flight Systems, Inc.
v. Elgood-Mayo Corp."'2 Flight Systems, Inc. made an oral agreement to
manufacture and install electric control panels in a locomotive for Elgood-
Mayo Corp.122 Elgood-Mayo in turn later issued a confirmation of the oral
contract in the form of a purchase order for the panels.1 2 3 Elgood-Mayo's
customer, Perini Corporation, refused to accept the locomotive because of
defects to motors unrelated to the panels supplied by Flight Systems.124
Elgood-Mayo notified Flight Systems that it would not pay for the panels,
relying on a clause of the purchase order stating that, "[p]ayment to Flight
Systems for this order is based on successful testing and acceptance by Per-
ini Corp."125 Thus, Elgood-Mayo, in its purchase order, had added a third-
party testing and acceptance requirement to Flight System's work, although
119. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 22.
120. Id. at 21 n.45 (quoting Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 338, 342,
408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980)).
121. 660 P.2d 909, 911 (Colo. App. 1982).
122. Id. at 910.
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the parties had reached an oral agreement for the terms of the work ear-
lier.12 6 However, the trial court entered judgment for the seller, Flight Sys-
tems, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.1 2 7
The court in Flight Systems provided the following analysis under
UCC § 2-207(2)(b) and its Comments 3 and 4:
By the court's ruling, it implicitly found that the purchase
order was not the contract; it was a confirmation of the oral
contract. . . . Since this provision would have been a mate-
rial alteration and was not expressly agreed to by Flight Sys-
tems, it did not become a part of the contract, and Flight
Systems was not bound by it.' 28
In Flight Systems, therefore, the buyer, Elgood-Mayo, was relying on a
clause of its confirming purchase order that would have required the "suc-
cessful testing and acceptance" by an independent, third-party, the ultimate
customer for the locomotive, Perini.12 9 The court, though, was quite clear
that additional terms in the purchase order for third-party testing repre-
sented a material alteration from the original oral contract that did not
become part of the parties' contract by operation of law under UCC § 2-
207(2)(b). 30
As Flight Systems, Inc. indicates, the presence of an earlier-concluded
oral agreement can turn a document like a purchase order into a confirma-
tion for comparison with the oral agreement, and exclusion of any materi-
ally altering additional terms. Although one of the parties may have
regarded its document as a primary offer or acceptance, such documents
may instead be confirmation documents if they follow an oral agreement
earlier concluded. However, if the purported confirmation form contains
forward-looking language anticipating the receipt of additional terms from
the other party, the document may not be a confirmation, despite prior
negotiations, but just more evidence of ongoing negotiations not yet con-
cluded. The analysis of offer and acceptance forms in this sense can be-
come subtle indeed.
XV. BEWARE!: THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
PROVISION MAY NOT APPLY
In Mantaline Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc., the district court found that
a quotation to sell window gaskets for construction of a building in Denver,
Colorado, was not an offer because it contained forward-looking language
anticipating that the buyer might provide a purchase order, and because it




129. Id. at 910.
130. Id. at 911.
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off on by the seller.13 1 The buyer did send a purchase order to the seller for
the gaskets that contained additional terms, including an arbitration provi-
sion in the event of a dispute and an indemnification provision.132 The
seller did not expressly accept or sign the purchase order as it had indicated
it would do in its earlier quotation, but simply responded by shipping the
gaskets without objecting to any terms of the purchase order.'33 The dis-
trict court concluded that the parties had reached their agreement by the
seller's conduct in shipping the gaskets, and that the arbitration and indem-
nification clauses of the purchase order were excluded from the resulting
contract by the operation of UCC § 2-207(3), which states:
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although
the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a con-
tract. In such case, the terms of the particular contract con-
sist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree,
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under
any other provisions of [this Act]. 134
Thus, the district court concluded that because the quotation and the
purchase order were not in agreement as to the arbitration and indemnifi-
cation clauses, those terms fell out of the agreement.13 5
However, the Sixth Circuit on review reversed the district court in
Mantaline, holding that the battle of the forms provisions of § 2-207(2) and
(3) had no application to the set of facts.1 36 The court stated that UCC § 2-
207(2) had no application because the buyer's purchase order, which was
indeed the offer, contained language making its acceptance expressly con-
ditional on acceptance of its terms; under § 2-207(2) additional terms do
not come in if "[t]he offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer." 137 Further, the court stated that § 2-207(3) did not apply because it
"is relevant only where subsection [1] applies-that is, where the 'expres-
sion of acceptance . . . states terms additional or different from those of-
fered.' "138 The court found that the seller "gave no 'expression of
acceptance' " that stated terms different from those offered by the buyer's
purchase order because the seller's acceptance simply consisted of its ship-
ment of goods in response to the purchase order; the seller had said noth-
ing in response to the offer of the purchase order except to ship.139 The
court noted that under UCC § 2-206(1)(b)1 40 an order may be accepted by
131. No. 97-4473, 2000 WL 799337, at *2 (6th Cir. June 8, 2000) (unpublished table).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.10(c) (West 2011) [Ohio's UCC § 2-207(3)]).
135. Id
136. Id at *1.
137. Id. at *3.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.09 (West 2011).
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the prompt shipment of goods.141 There was no reason to go back to the
seller's quotation to compare it with the purchase order because the quota-
tion, with its forward-looking language had been just an invitation to deal
further, not an offer. 42 Moreover, the seller's act of shipment was not a
statement of acceptance that contained additional or different terms that
would need to be compared with the terms of the offer in the buyer's
purchase order under the battle of the forms provisions. 143 As the court
stated, the seller's "price quotation form did not satisfy the requirements
for an offer. Thus, there was no 'battle' here that could trigger the provi-
sions of section [2-207]."144 Further:
In sum, the forward-looking language in Mantaline's invita-
tion to deal (the price quotation form) fell by the wayside
when the contract was formed. Because PPG's purchase or-
der constituted the sole 'offer', and Mantaline's shipment of
conforming goods constituted an unqualified 'acceptance' of
the offer, the resulting contract included the terms of PPG's
purchase order providing for indemnification and arbitra-
tion of disputes.145
Thus, although indemnification and arbitration clauses would be materially
altering terms that would fall out of the agreement under a battle of the
forms analysis,' 4 6 that analysis under UCC § 2-207 was never reached be-
cause the seller's mere "unqualified" acceptance by shipment involved no
competing acknowledgment form by the seller.
The court appears to imply that if the seller's earlier quotation in
Mantaline had been a firm, final offer, with no "forward-looking" language
that anticipated continued negotiations and the receipt of additional terms
from the buyer-and then had been faced with the purchaser's purchase
order as a counter-offer that stated in its terms that there would be no
"effective" contract except as provided under the terms of the order-then
yes, there would have been no contract except as created by the parties'
conduct in the shipment and acceptance of goods. In that case, it would
have been appropriate, indeed, under § 2-207(3) to compare the terms of
the offer and counteroffer to see where they agreed, accepting only the
agreed terms as the ultimate terms of the contract under the analysis of
subsection (3). But, alas, for the seller it was to be because the quotation
was not a true, firm and final "offer" that could be compared with the
purchase order as a counteroffer. Thus, the court wrote:
141. Mantaline, 2000 WL 799337 at *3.
142. Id
143. Id. at *4.
144. Id.
145. Id at *4 (emphasis added).
146. See supra Part XIII.
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For a 'battle of the forms' to arise and trigger the provisions
of § 2-207, there must be conflicting forms to begin with,
each of which satisfies the common-law or statutory require-
ments for an offer. If the first form is not an offer, there can
be no battle.147
Clearly, a manufacturer or other seller should be aware that it is difficult to
qualify a quotation as an offer and treat the buyer's purchase order with
caution accordingly. A manufacturer should always carefully review a
buyer's purchase order for any term that should be objected to, and return
the form with the objections noted on the form. The seller should also
insist on a signed acknowledgement of a change from the buyer on any
terms that the seller feels it must either have or have eliminated.
There is another example of a case in which the battle of the forms
provisions would not apply. If both the parties have executed a written
contract and the buyer, in effect, attempts to amend it unilaterally by issu-
ing a purchase order with new terms a few days later, the battle of the
forms provision of UCC § 2-207 has no application. In that instance the
purchase order would not be a confirmation of an oral contract, but an
attempt to modify a written contract that had already been formed previ-
ously.1 48 The battle of the forms provision, concerning a contract accept-
ance or confirmation applies "only to the formation of the contract."149
XVI. CONCLUSION: MANUFACTURERS AND OTHER SELLERS
TAKE CAUTION
Manufacturers and other sellers need to be aware that if the quotation
contains any forward-looking language anticipating further receipt of terms
from the buyer in a purchase order or insists on the seller's review and
acceptance of any anticipated terms from the buyer, the courts will likely
find that the quotation is not an offer, no matter how detailed. If the quo-
tation is not a true offer, and the seller then receives the purchase order
and ships goods in response to it without objecting to the purchase order's
terms, the seller will likely find that it has accepted all of the terms of the
order. In this sense, if Article 2 contains a bias, it appears to favor buyers
because in so many circumstances the seller's quotation will not qualify as
the offer (as opposed to a mere invitation to deal), and more often than not
the Code allows the buyer to take control of the transaction with a
purchase order.
Also, as we have seen, the seller cannot depend on a form acknowl-
edgement sent after receiving a purchase order to take back control be-
cause in most instances an acknowledgement will be held to be an
147. Id. (citing Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. V. Leviton Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir.
1994) (applying Minnesota law)).
148. See Migerobe, Inc. v. Certina USA, Inc., 924 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Co-
lumbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royester Co., 451 F.2d 3, 11-12 (4th Cir. 1971)).
149. Id. at 1336.
520 [VOL. 30:491
FINDING THE MISSISSIPPI SALES CONTRACT
acceptance, not a counteroffer, and important conflicting terms included in
the acknowledgement may fall out automatically as material alterations
under the battle of the forms provision of UCC § 2-207(2). Even if the
seller's acknowledgement form is deemed to be a counteroffer (because it
clearly states (1) it is a counteroffer-not an acceptance-and (2) that
there will be no contract except on the seller's terms), and the seller then
ships without receiving an express assent to his terms from the buyer, then
any different terms of the seller are likely to fall out under § 2-207(3). The
seller, in many instances, cannot rely on a form acknowledgment, but must
review the purchase order and explicitly reject any terms it cannot accept
by marking the purchase order up and sending it back to the buyer with the
seller's objections noted (keeping a clear copy of the mark-ups for the
seller's file). The seller may also wish to examine its form quotation to
make it into an explicit, final, signed offer inviting the buyer's acceptance
by the execution and return of a simple, signed form acknowledgement.
Finally, if the seller simply ships in response to a buyer's purchase order-
even an order that contains materially altering terms from the seller's ear-
lier quotation-then the seller will find that its shipment constituted an
unqualified acceptance of the order's terms, and that the battle of the
forms provisions do not come up at all.150
One might think reading White and Summers that the Code is neutral
between buyers and sellers because of its emphasis on precluding the "last
shot."" Ideally, it would be. However, the reality for sellers is that it is
understood in many industries-and may arguably even be a "usage of the
trade"-that large, sophisticated buyers can be expected to respond to a
seller's quotation with a detailed form purchase order that will attempt to
take control of the transaction, that will be expressly conditional on the
acceptance of its terms, that explicitly rejects any contrary prior statement
of terms, and that will have to be reviewed carefully by the seller for objec-
tionable terms or omissions and responded to accordingly.
Again, though, a manufacturer or other seller may wish to take steps
to minimize its risks by acting to make its quotation form, where possible,
an explicit offer for immediate acceptance. Buyers, on the other hand, will
want to be sure to respond to a quotation with a purchase order that states
the order is the offer, that it is expressly conditional on its acceptance, that
rejects any contrary terms previously proposed by the seller, and invites
immediate acceptance.
Finally, whether seller or buyer, one must realize, as White and Sum-
mers points out, the following caveat:
Under the present state of the law we believe that there is
no language that the lawyer can put on a form that will al-
ways assure the client of forming a contract on the client's
own terms. These efforts will be frustrated. . .. If one must
150. See supra Part XV (the discussion of Mantaline Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc.).
151. See wHYTE & SUMMERs, supra note 89, at 16.
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have a term, that party should bargain with the other party
for the term. . .. If a seller must have the term to reduce its
liability but cannot strike a bargain for it, the only answer
may be to raise the price, buy insurance, or-as a last re-
sort-have an extra martini every evening and do not capi-
talize the corporation too heavily.15 2
Notice that while White and Summers start off talking in neutral language
in this segment between sellers and buyers, at the end the example they
give is of a "seller" who better take that extra libation if it must have a term
for which it cannot get the buyer's explicit agreement. That is because
without the buyer's explicit cooperation, there may be little salvation for
the seller in the battle of the forms provisions where the buyer has pro-
tected the terms it insists on with a purchase order. Again, if there is a bias
in the battle of the forms provisions, it appears to favor the buyer armed
with a purchase order. Manufacturers and other sellers need to be aware
of the bias and treat the buyers' forms with caution accordingly.
152. WHYTE & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 24-25 (emphasis added).
522 [VOL. 30:491
